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Abstract—We consider network aggregative games to model
and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is
influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified
by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems
where each agent minimizes a quadratic cost function, that
depends on its own strategy and on a convex combination of the
strategies of its neighbors, and is subject to personalized convex
constraints. We analyze the best response dynamics and we
propose alternative distributed algorithms to steer the strategies
of the rational agents to a Nash equilibrium configuration. The
convergence of these schemes is guaranteed under different
sufficient conditions, depending on the matrices defining the cost
and on the network. Additionally, we propose an extension to the
network aggregative game setting that allows for multiple rounds
of communications among the agents, and we illustrate how it
can be combined with consensus theory to recover a solution
to the mean field control problem in a distributed fashion,
that is, without requiring the presence of a central coordinator.
Finally, we apply our theoretical findings to study a novel multi-
dimensional, convex-constrained model of opinion dynamics and
a hierarchical demand-response scheme for energy management
in smart buildings, extending literature results.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in
modeling and control of populations of agents that interact
through a network. If the agents are noncooperative and profit-
maximizing, these systems can be studied combining ideas of
game theory and network analysis. Traditionally, the literature
on network game theory has focused on games in which each
agent behavior is influenced by its one-to-one interaction with
the neighbors [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. When the size of the
population becomes very large, however, the analysis of these
models may become computationally intractable. Moreover,
in many applications involving large populations of agents
the well-being of an agent cannot be described as the overall
result of individual two-player interactions, but should rather
be modeled as a unique function depending on the agents
strategy and on a quantity (either common to all agents or
agent-specific) that depends on the aggregate behavior of the
entire population.
Examples of applications where the influence of the pop-
ulation behavior is the same for all agents are demand side
management in smart grids [6], [7], [8], charging coordination
of plug-in electric vehicles [9], [10], congestion control [11]
and economic markets [12]. This type of interactions can be
modeled using the theory of (generalized) aggregative games
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since the payoff of each agent is a function of its own strategy
and of a common aggregator function, whose value depends
on the strategies of all the players [13]. In this framework,
to compute its best response each agent needs to know the
aggregate of all the other players’ strategies; this may not be
desirable when the population size is very large. One way
to overcome this issue is to address large-size aggregative
games by assuming a continuum of players that are influenced
only by the population statistical distribution [14], [15]. These
models can be efficiently analyzed by exploiting the so-called
Mean Field (MF) approximation. Specifically, several schemes
have been proposed in the literature to coordinate the agents
behavior in a decentralized fashion, by using a statistical
description of the population [14], [16], or by means of a
central coordinator [9], [17].
Classical aggregative and mean field games are based on the
assumption that all the agents are affected by the population
via the same aggregator function. On the other hand, we
consider here situations where the interaction, even though
not one-to-one as in typical network games, still possesses
a well determined structure. Examples where such structures
appear are (generalized) quasi-aggregative games [18] where
each agent has a different interaction function, leader-follower
games [19] where some agents have more control authority
or knowledge than others, games with local/agent-dependent
cost functions [20], [21], games where the agents are allowed
to interact only locally [8], [22], or games where the agents
have different stubbornness [23], [24]. Here, we consider a
setting in which each agent is influenced by the aggregate
strategies of an agent-dependent subset of the population,
which is defined by an underlying network. We refer to this
type of games as Network Aggregative (NA) games. Among
these, we restrict our attention to games in which each agent
minimizes a quadratic cost function that depends on its own
strategy and on a convex combination of the strategies of its
neighbors, that we refer to as the neighbors’ aggregate state.
Moreover, contrary to traditional (quasi-) aggregative games,
we allow the aggregator function to be vector valued instead
of scalar valued.
For this class of systems, we are interested in sets of
strategies where no agent has interest in unilaterally deviating
from its own behavior, that is, we aim at characterizing the
Nash equilibria of the NA game. Moreover, we analyze the
dynamics arising in a population where each agent updates
synchronously its strategy in response to the strategies of its
neighbors. The simplest type of dynamics that we investigate
is the so-called Best Response (BR) dynamics, where the
agents adopt at every iteration the strategy that minimizes
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2their cost, given the current neighbors’ aggregate state. Our
first technical contribution is the derivation of conditions on
the cost function and on the network structure that guarantee
convergence of the BR dynamics to a Nash equilibrium. For
cases where the BR dynamics are not guaranteed to converge,
we propose different strategy update schemes with memory
that can be implemented by the agents in a distributed fashion
and, under different conditions, ensure convergence to a Nash
equilibrium.
Secondly, we show how the setting of NA games can
be used to steer a population of agents to an almost Nash
equilibrium of a deterministic MF game by allowing multiple
rounds of communications between two strategy updates. To
this end, we use results from consensus theory to ensure that
the agents can reconstruct the average of the strategies of the
entire population by communicating with their neighbors. The
advantage of this approach is that it does not require communi-
cations with all the agents in the population (as in aggregative
games) making our method scalable as the population size
increases, nor the presence of a central coordinator or a statis-
tical description of the population (as in MF games). The task
of recovering a MF Nash equilibrium by allowing only local
communications over a network has been already considered
in the literature for the case of linear cost [8] or scalar state
variables [25], via variational inequality approaches. Instead,
we consider here a setting where each agent solves a multi-
dimensional convex-constrained optimization problem with
quadratic cost function. A key aspect that differentiates our
approach from more standard distributed optimization schemes
is that in our setting, at every iteration of the algorithm, each
agent selects its strategy as the BR to its current estimate of
the population behavior. This is a fundamental feature for the
applicability of our schemes in a population of non-cooperative
agents. We also notice that the inverse problem of recovering
consensus via MF games has been studied in [26], [27].
The contributions of the paper are organized as follows.
• As motivating application of NA games, we formulate in
Section II a novel extension of the classical Friedkin and
Johnsen model of opinion dynamics by allowing each
agent to update its opinions regarding a collection of
different topics, linked together by convex and compact
constraints. Moreover, we suggest a distributed imple-
mentation of a classic model of demand-response scheme
for smart energy management, as motivating application
for distributed MF control.
• In Section III we define NA games and illustrate their
relations with aggregative and MF games. In Section III-C
we extend the definition of NA games by allowing
multiple rounds of communications.
• In Section IV we introduce the concept of aggregation
mapping, generalizing the ideas presented in [17], and
characterize the game-theoretical properties of the set of
strategies computed as BR to its fixed points, for both
NA and MF games.
• In Section V we derive conditions guaranteeing the
convergence of the BR dynamics and of newly introduced
update schemes to a fixed point of the aggregation
mapping, generalizing the results in [28].
• In Section VI we apply our theoretical findings to the
applications introduced in Section II, extending previous
literature results.
Section VII concludes the paper and highlights several pos-
sible extensions and applications. Appendix A presents some
background definitions and results from operator theory; Ap-
pendix B contains all the proofs of the technical results.
Notation
R, R>0, R≥0 respectively denote the set of real, positive
real, non-negative real numbers; N denotes the set of positive
natural numbers; 2N denotes the set of even numbers; Z
denotes the set of integer numbers; for a, b ∈ Z, a ≤ b,
Z[a, b] := [a, b] ∩ Z. In denotes the n-dimensional identity
matrix; 1n denotes the n-dimensional vector with all entries
equal to 1. For a given Q ∈ Rn×n, the positive definite
notation Q  0 (as well as <,≺,4) implies Q = Q>.
For a given Q ∈ Rn×n, Q  0, we denote by HQ the
Hilbert space Rn with inner product 〈·, ·〉Q : Rn × Rn → R
defined as 〈x, y〉Q := x>Qy, and norm ‖·‖Q : Rn → R≥0
defined as ‖x‖Q :=
√
x>Qx; ‖x‖ := ‖x‖In . The projection
operator in HQ, ProjQC : Rn → C ⊆ Rn, is defined
as ProjQC (x) := arg miny∈C ‖x− y‖Q. A ⊗ B denotes the
Kronecker product between matrices A and B. Given a matrix
P , we define Pij := [P ]ij its element in position (i, j)
and for any ν ∈ N, P νij denotes the element in position
(i, j) of the matrix P ν . The matrix P is row-stochastic if∑N
j=1 Pij = 1 for all i ∈ Z [1, N ] and doubly-stochastic if P
and P> are row-stochastic. The matrix P is primitive if there
exists h ∈ N such that Ph is element-wise strictly positive.
‖P‖Q := sup
{‖Px‖Q
‖x‖Q | x ∈ Rn \ {0}
}
denotes the induced
matrix norm. We denote by Λ(P ) the set of eigenvalues of
P , by ρ(P ) := max { |λ| | λ ∈ Λ(P )} its spectral radius
and by σmax(P ) its maximum singular value. If P < 0,
we denote by P
1
2 < 0 its principal square root. Given
X ⊆ Rn, A ∈ Rn×n and b ∈ Rn, AX + b denotes
the set {Ax+ b ∈ Rn | x ∈ X}; given X1, . . . ,XN ⊆ Rn,
X1×N := X1×. . .×XN , 1N (
∑N
i=1 Xi) := { 1N
∑N
i=1 xi ∈ Rn |
xi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ]}, conv {Xi}Ni=1 := {
∑N
i=1 λixi ∈
Rn | xi ∈ Xi, λi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ],
∑N
i=1 λi = 1}.
Given two sets X1,X2 and a vector x1 ∈ X1 we define the
premetric µ(X1,X2) := supx1∈X1 infx2∈X2 ‖x1 − x2‖ and
µ(x1,X2) := infx∈X2 ‖x1 − x‖. Given N vectors vi ∈ Rn,
i ∈ Z [1, N ], we denote [v1; . . . ; vN ] :=
[
v>1 . . . v
>
N
]> ∈ RNn.
Given f, g : X ⊆ Rn → R, f(x) = O(g(x)) denotes that there
exists K > 0 such that f(x) ≤ Kg(x) for all x ∈ X.
II. AGGREGATIVE GAMES OVER A NETWORK: TWO
MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
A. Multi-dimentional constrained opinion dynamics in social
networks with stubborn agents
We first consider the problem of modeling how ideas,
innovations or behaviors spread in a social network of N ∈ N
agents [29]. Generalizing the setting described in [30], we
assume that each agent i ∈ Z [1, N ] has a vector xi ∈ [0, 1]n of
3opinions regarding n ∈ N topics. Each component xis ∈ [0, 1]
represents the opinion of agent i about topic s ∈ Z [1, n],
where 0 represents an extremely negative and 1 an extremely
positive opinion. We denote by xi(0) ∈ [0, 1]n the initial
opinion of agent i. Moreover, we specify the social network
by the weighted adjacency matrix P ∈ RN×N , where the
element Pij ∈ [0, 1] denotes the relevance of the opinion of
agent j to the decision of agent i. In the following we assume
without loss of generality that
∑
j Pij = 1, for all i ∈ Z [1, N ].
To describe the opinion dynamics, we consider a synchronous
repetitive game where at every iteration k each agent i commu-
nicates once with its neighborsN i := {j ∈ Z[1, N ] | Pij > 0}
and updates its opinion according to the optimization problem
xi ?
(
xN
i
)
:= arg min
xi∈Rn
N∑
j 6=i
(Pij‖xi − xj‖2)+ θi‖xi − xi(0)‖2
s.t. xi ∈ X i. (1)
The cost function in (1) comprises two terms: the first one
models the influence of the neighbors to the new opinion of
agent i, the second one models the “stubbornness” of agent i
about its initial opinion. Additional constraints on the agents’
opinions across the n topics, as for example the fact that the
opinions regarding two topics should not differ more than a
given threshold, and on their stubbornness can be encoded via
the constraint set X i ⊆ [0, 1]n. The agents are assumed to be
heterogeneous in the sense that the stubbornness parameter
θi ≥ 0, the constraint set X i and the weights {Pij}Nj 6=i may
be different for every agent. Following the nomenclature used
in [30], we refer to the agents for which X i = {xi(0)}, that
is, agents that are not influenced by the neighbors, as fully
stubborn, to the agents for which θi = 0 and X i = [0, 1]n as
followers and to all the remaining agents as partially stubborn.
In the absence of constraints, the solution to (1) for each
topic decouples, hence we can consider n = 1 without loss of
generality. The solution in this case is given by
xi ?(xN
i
) = 11+θi
∑
j 6=i Pijx
j + θi1+θix
i
(0),
which leads to the BR dynamics xi(k+1) = x
i ?(xN
i
(k)) =
1
1+θi
∑
j 6=i Pijx
j
(k) +
θi
1+θi
xi(0) which is a particular case of
the standard Friedkin and Johnsen model [31], with parameters
Λ := diag
(
1
1+θ1
, . . . , 11+θN
)
and W := P . For the case in
which there is at least one partially stubborn agent it is possible
to show, with the same argument used in [30], that the BR
dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game in (1),
that is, to a configuration where no agent has incentive in
modifying its opinion given the opinions of its neighbors. If
on the other hand, all the agents are followers, one recovers the
standard DeGroot model [32], whose convergence properties
have been exhaustively investigated using classical consensus
theory. We note that, in this case, the Nash equilibria coincide
with the right eigenvectors of the matrix P corresponding to
the eigenvalue λ = 1.
As a corollary of the theory developed in this paper,
we derive in Section VI-A conditions under which the BR
dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium in the presence of
stubborn agents and generic convex constraints. Moreover,
for the case in which the BR dynamics do not converge, we
propose the use of alternative opinion-update rules that ensure
convergence. To this end, we note that the cost function in (1)
can be rewritten, up to constant terms that do not depend on
xi, as
J i(xi, σi) := (1 + θi)‖xi‖2 − 2(σi + θixi(0))>xi, (2)
where σi =
∑N
j 6=i Pijx
j is the average opinion of the
neighbors of agent i. Consequently, the game in (1) can be
thought of as a game where each agent tries to minimize a cost
function that depends on its own strategy xi and on a convex
combination of the strategies of its neighbors σi, resulting in
a NA game, as defined in Section III-A.
B. Demand-response methods and mean field control via local
communications
As second motivating example, we consider a population
of N ∈ N loads whose electricity consumption ui =[
ui1, . . . , u
i
T
] ∈ RT over the horizon T = Z [1, T ] is scheduled
according to the following demand-response scheme
ui ?(σ¯) := arg min
u∈RT
∑
t∈T
(
ρi
∥∥ut − uˆit∥∥2 + p(σ¯t)ut) (3)
s.t. st+1 = aist + γiut ∀t ∈ T
[s(u);u] ∈ (Si × U i) ∩ Ci,
where st = st(u) is the state of the load at time t (e.g.,
its temperature in case of heating ventilation air conditioning
systems [33], as detailed in Section VI-B, and thermostatically
controlled loads [34] or its state of charge in case of plug-
in electric vehicles [9], [10], [17]), si1 ∈ R is the given
initial state, ai, γi ∈ R\{0} are parameters modeling the
dynamics and the efficiency of load i, σ¯t = 1N
∑N
i=1 u
i
t ∈ R
is the population aggregate energy demand at time t, σ¯ :=
[σ¯1; . . . ; σ¯T ] ∈ RT . The energy consumption u and state
vector s(u) are constrained by the personalized sets U i ⊂ RT
and Si ⊂ RT , respectively, and by the coupling constraint
set Ci ⊂ R2T . The first term in the cost function of (3)
models the curtailment cost that each agent encounters for
deviating from its nominal energy schedule uˆit, according to
the Taguchi loss function [35], ρi > 0 being a constant
weighting parameter. The second term models the demand-
response mechanism: the price that each agent has to pay
for the required energy varies according to a price function
p(σ¯t) that is increasing in the total energy demand at time
t. Since the price function depends on the average strategy
σ¯ of all the players, that is σi = σ¯ for all agents, this is a
deterministic quadratic mean field game, as described in [10],
[16], [17]. The associated mean field control problem aims
at designing a price vector p(σ¯) such that the set of optimal
responses {ui ?(σ¯)}Ni=1 possesses some desirable properties in
terms of the MF game in (3). Approaches to solve this problem
iteratively via a central coordinator have been proposed in
[9], [10], [17], [33]. Here we propose a distributed algorithm
with guaranteed convergence to an equilibrium price signal,
by using local communications only. We also investigate the
4relation of the resulting solution with the one obtained via a
central coordinator.
III. GAME SETTING AND PREVIOUS WORK
A. Constrained network aggregative games
Consider a population of N ∈ N heterogeneous agents,
where each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ] controls a decision variable
xi, taking values in the set X i ⊂ Rn, and interacts with
the other agents via a directed network (Figure 1). In the
xi? xj?
(· · ·)
(· · ·)
Pij
Fig. 1: Scheme of a network aggregative game.
following, we specify the network by the weighted adjacency
matrix P ∈ RN×N , whose element Pij ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the strength (or relevance) of the communication from agent
j to agent i, Pij = 0 implying no communication. The
aim of agent i is to minimize its individual deterministic
cost J i
(
xi, σi
)
that depends on its own strategy xi and its
aggregation σi :=
∑N
j=1 Pijx
j with the strategies of its
neighbors N i := {j 6= i | Pij > 0}. Specifically, each agent
i ∈ Z[1, N ] aims at computing the Best Response (BR) to the
neighbors’ aggregate state σi
xibr(σ
i) := arg min
xi∈X i
J i
(
xi, σi
)
(4)
= arg min
xi∈X i
J i
(
xi, Piix
i +
∑N
j 6=i Pijx
j
)
.
Since the neighbors’ aggregate state σi is different for each
agent and is specified by the network, we refer to this problem
as a Network Aggregative (NA) game. In classical game
theory, a set of strategies in which every agent is playing a
best response to the other players’ strategies is called Nash
equilibrium. In the aggregative case, the concept is similar:
the population is at a NA Nash equilibrium if each agent
has no individual benefit in changing its strategy, given the
aggregation among the strategies of the neighbors.
Definition 1 (Network aggregative Nash equilibrium):
Given N cost functions {J i : Rn × Rn → R}Ni=1 and a
weighted adjacency matrix P ∈ RN×N , a set of strategies{
x¯i ∈ X i ⊆ Rn}N
i=1
is a NA Nash equilibrium for (4) if, for
all i ∈ Z[1, N ],
J i
(
x¯i,
∑N
j=1 Pij x¯
j
)
= min
y∈X i
J i
(
y, Piiy +
∑N
j 6=i Pij x¯
j
)
. 
One of the main challenges in analyzing aggregative games,
and games in general, is to characterize the evolution of the
players’ strategies when the game is repeated iteratively. For
this problem to be well defined one has to specify the update
rule used by each agent i, at iteration k, to select its updated
optimal strategy xi ?(k+1) in response to the strategies of its
neighbors. The simplest dynamics are obtained when, at every
iteration, all the players synchronously compute their BRs to
the current strategies of the neighbors, that is
xi ?(k+1) := x
i
br(σ
i
(k)), (5)
then communicate and update the neighbors’ aggregate state.
This scheme is known as “best response” dynamics or “my-
opic” dynamics [18], since the agents do not take into account
the past or future evolution of the game to update their
strategies. One of the main aims of the paper is to derive
conditions under which the BR dynamics converge to a Nash
equilibrium of the original game as described in Definition 1.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to NA games satis-
fying the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Game setting): Each agent i ∈ Z[1, N ] has
a convex and compact constraint set X i ⊂ Rn and quadratic
cost
J i(xi, σi) := qix
i>Qxi + 2
(
Cσi + ci
)>
xi, (6)
where xi, σi ∈ Rn, Q  0, qi > 0, C ∈ Rn×n and ci ∈ Rn.
The weighted adjacency matrix P ∈ RN×N is row stochastic,
that is,
∑N
j=1 Pij = 1,∀i ∈ Z[1, N ]. 
Note that the cost function in (6) combines two different terms:
a quadratic cost specific to the individual and an affine term
associated with the neighbors’ aggregate state σi. Under this
assumption, the minimizer in (4) is unique.
B. Aggregative games, deterministic mean field games and
mean field control
If the network is fully connected, that is, if σi = σ¯ =
1
N
∑N
j=1 x
j ∈ Rn for all i, then the corresponding NA game
is a particular case of aggregative game with aggregator σ¯.
Aggregative games, in turn, have a strong connection with
deterministic Mean Field (MF) games. The latter term is used
in the literature to denote a game, played among a large
population of N heterogeneous agents, where each agent is
influenced by the statistical distribution of the strategies across
the population. If each agent is influenced by the first moment
of the distribution only, deterministic MF games coincide with
aggregative games with aggregator σ¯ and hence with NA
games over fully connected networks. Mathematically, in all
these games each agent i ∈ Z [1, N ] aims at computing its BR
xibr(σ¯) := arg min
xi∈X i
J i(xi, σ¯) (7)
to the aggregate strategy σ¯ of all the players.
Definition 2 (MF Nash equilibrium [17, Definition 1]):
Given N cost functions {J i : Rn × Rn → R}Ni=1 and ε > 0,
a set of strategies
{
x¯i ∈ X i ⊆ Rn}N
i=1
is a MF ε-Nash
equilibrium for (7) if, for all i ∈ Z[1, N ],
J i
(
x¯i, 1N
∑N
j=1 x¯
j
)
≤ min
y∈X i
J i
(
y, 1N
(
y +
∑N
j 6=i x¯
j
))
+ ε.
(8)
It is a MF Nash equilibrium if (8) holds with ε = 0. 
5One of the objectives of mean field control theory is to study
conditions under which it is possible to steer the population to
such Nash equilibria, by using global macroscopic incentives
only, see for example [8], [9], [17]. Let
xi ?(z) := arg min
x∈X i
J i(x, z) (9)
be the optimal solution that agent i would compute, according
to the cost function J i given in (6), in response to a fixed
global incentive z and consider the aggregation mapping A :
Rn →
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 X i
)
⊂ Rn, defined as
A(z) := 1N
∑N
i=1 x
i ?(z). (10)
For the quadratic cost function considered in (6), it is proven
in [17, Theorem 1] that A in (10) has a fixed point z¯ = A(z¯)
and the set of strategies
{
xi ?(z¯) ∈ X i}N
i=1
is an εN -Nash
equilibrium for (7), with εN decreasing to zero with rate
1
N as the population size N grows. To find such a fixed
point, and hence steer the population to an ε-Nash equilib-
rium, one can use an iterative scheme among the agents and
a central coordinator where, at every iteration step k, the
central coordinator broadcasts a reference signal z(k) to the
population and each agent i responds by computing its optimal
strategy xi ?(k) := x
i ?(z(k)). The central coordinator then
collects the average A(z(k)) of such strategies and updates
the reference signal according to z(k+1) = Φk(z(k),A(z(k)))
[17, Algorithm 1]. The feedback mapping Φk(·, ·) can be
selected to guarantee convergence, depending on the regularity
properties of the aggregation mapping A. Suitable iterations
and sufficient conditions on the matrices defining the cost
in (6) are given in [17, Corollary 1]. For example, if A is
a contraction mapping (see Definition 4 in Appendix A) then
the Picard–Banach mapping ΦP–B(z(k),A(z(k))) := A(z(k))
ensures convergence to the unique fixed point of the aggrega-
tion mapping A.
Note that the centrally coordinated solution detailed above
cannot be used to steer the agents to an equilibrium in NA
games since, in this case, the signal σi is different for every
agent. On the contrary, we show below that the distributed
algorithms derived for NA games can be used to approximate
the solution of MF games. For this purpose, we define one
last class of games: NA games with multiple rounds of
communications.
C. Multiple-communication network aggregative games solve
the mean field control problem
The solution to the MF control problem outlined in Sec-
tion III-B relies on the presence of a central coordinator that
at every iteration computes the average signal A(z(k)) and
broadcasts the reference signal z(k+1) to the population of
agents. To solve the original MF problem by means of local
communications only, we consider a scenario where each agent
i ∈ Z [1, N ] tries to recover the overall population average σ¯
by communicating ν ∈ N times with its neighbors; we indicate
the resulting local estimate by σiν ∈ Rn. Formally, each agent
i ∈ Z [1, N ] approximates the optimization problem in (7)
with
xibr(σ
i
ν) := arg min
x∈X i
J i(x, σiν), (11)
where σiν :=
∑N
j=1 P
ν
ijx
j and P νij denotes the element (i, j)
of P ν . Definition 1 on NA Nash equilibrium can be extended
to the case of multiple communications as follows.
Definition 3 (Multiple-communication NA Nash equilibrium):
Given N cost functions {J i : Rn ×Rn → R}Ni=1, a weighted
adjacency matrix P ∈ RN×N and a fixed number of
communications ν ∈ N, a set of strategies {x¯i ∈ X i}N
i=1
is a
NA Nash equilibrium for (11) if, for all i ∈ Z[1, N ], it holds
J i
(
x¯i,
∑N
j=1 P
ν
ij x¯
j
)
= min
y∈X i
J i
(
y, P νiiy +
∑N
j 6=i P
ν
ij x¯
j
)
. 
We show in the following how the update rules derived to
guarantee convergence to a NA Nash equilibrium of the game
in (4) can be applied also to the multiple-communication NA
game in (11) to steer the agents’ strategies to a MF ε-Nash
equilibrium of the MF game in (7), in a distributed fashion,
for large N and ν.
IV. ON NETWORK AGGREGATIVE AND MEAN FIELD
NASH EQUILIBRIA
To address the tasks described in Sections III-A and III-C,
we solve the following problems.
• Problem 1: Given a single (ν = 1) or multiple (ν > 1)
communication NA game, derive update rules and con-
ditions under which the agents’ strategies converge to a
NA Nash equilibrium, as described in Definition 1 and 3,
respectively;
• Problem 2: Given a deterministic MF game as in (7) over
a population of size N and a network with weighted
adjacency matrix PN , derive update rules and condi-
tions under which the agents’ strategies converge, in
a distributed fashion, to a MF ε-Nash equilibrium, as
described in Definition 2, with ε decreasing as N and
ν increase.
To solve these two problems, we start by defining the optimal
response of an agent to a fixed signal zi ∈ Rn as
xi ?(zi) := arg min
xi∈X i
J i(xi, zi). (12)
This mapping differs from the BR mapping since the second
argument in the cost function J i(·, ·) is not the neighbors’
aggregate state σi (that in general could depend on xi), but
is a fixed signal zi (that does not depend on the optimization
variable xi). Moreover, the mapping in (12) differs from the
one in (9) since the signal zi is possibly different for each
agent. Let z :=
[
z1; . . . ; zN
] ∈ RNn be a vector of (possibly
different) signals for each agent and define the mapping x? :
RNn → X1×N as
x?(z) :=
[
x1 ?(z1); . . . ;xN ?(zN )
] ∈ RNn, (13)
whose sub-vectors are the optimal strategies computed by each
agent i according to the local signal zi. The mapping x?
in (13) can be used to define an extended aggregation mapping
6Aν that, given a vector z, returns the updated estimates of the
population average, after one optimization and ν communica-
tion steps. Formally, Aν : RNn → (P ν ⊗ In)X1×N ⊂ RNn
is defined as
Aν(z) :=
 A
1
ν(z)
...
ANν (z)
 :=

∑N
j=1 P
ν
1jx
j ?(zj)
...∑N
j=1 P
ν
Njx
j ?(zj)
 (14)
= (P ν ⊗ In)x?(z) =: Pνx?(z).
A. Problem 1: Nash equilibria of single and multiple-
communication network aggregative games
In the following theorem we show that the fixed points
of the aggregation mapping Aν can be used to find a Nash
equilibrium of the NA game with ν communications, for any
population size N , under the following assumption on the
network structure.
Assumption 2 (Graph property): For the considered num-
ber ν ∈ N of communication steps and the given population
size N , the weighted adjacency matrix P satisfies P νii = 0 for
all i ∈ Z[1, N ]. 
Remark 1: Assumption 2 is equivalent to the absence of
cycles of length ν in the graph associated with P [36,
Theorem 4.1]. In the case of single-communication NA games,
that is if ν = 1 as defined in Section III-A, Assumption 2
is equivalent to the absence of self-loops, which means that
each agent plays against the average of its neighbors, itself
excluded. If Pii/qi is the same for each agent i ∈ Z [1, N ]
this assumption can be introduced without loss of generality
by redefining the Q matrix of the cost function J i in (6). Note
that the absence of self-loops is necessary but not sufficient
when ν > 1.
Assumption 2 guarantees that the neighbors’ aggregate state
σiν computed by each agent i does not depend on its own
strategy xi. As a consequence, the BR mapping (11) coincides
with the optimal response (12) to the signal zi := σiν =∑N
j=1 P
ν
ijx
j =
∑N
j 6=i P
ν
ijx
j . Therefore, if each agent is
playing the BR to the i-th sub-vector z¯i of a fixed point
z¯ =
[
z¯1; . . . , z¯N
]
of the aggregation mapping Aν , then the
new vector of neighbors’ aggregate states coincides with z¯.
This observation can be formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1 the mapping Aν in (14)
admits at least one fixed point z¯ = Aν(z¯). If also As-
sumption 2 holds and z¯ is a fixed point of Aν , then the
set of strategies
{
xi ?
(
z¯i
)}N
i=1
, with xi ? as in (12) for all
i ∈ Z[1, N ], is a NA Nash equilibrium for (11). 
Note that Theorem 1 implicitly ensures the existence of at
least one NA Nash equilibrium for all NA games satisfying
Assumptions 1 and 2. Moreover, under these assumptions, if
the vector
[
σ1ν (k); . . . , σ
N
ν (k)
]
of neighbors’ aggregate states
defined by the BR dynamics in (5) tends, as k →∞, to a fixed
point of the mapping Aν , then the agents’ strategies converge
to a NA Nash equilibrium. The derivation of conditions under
which this happens and of alternative update rules is postponed
to Section V. Finally, we note that MF games are NA games
over a complete network with the same self-weight Pii = 1/N
for all agents. If qi = q for all i, these games can be
reformulated in a form compatible with Assumption 2, as
suggested in Remark 1. Theorem 1 then guarantees that a MF
Nash equilibrium exists (as shown also in [17, Proposition 1])
and can be obtained in a distributed fashion. The drawback
is that, to this end, communications over a complete network
are required. Since in most cases this is not desirable in the
following section we derive conditions under which almost MF
Nash equilibria can be recovered using local communications
only.
B. Problem 2: Distributed solution to the mean field control
problem
To address Problem 2, we start by analyzing the relation be-
tween the extended aggregation mapping Aν in (14), obtained
via ν communications over the network P , and the aggregation
mapping A : RNn → ( 1N 1N1>N ⊗ In)X1×N ,
A(z) := ( 1N 1N1>N ⊗ In)x?(z) =: I x?(z), (15)
that arises out of a complete network. We assume the following
uniform bounds on the constraint sets X i and on qi.
Assumption 3 (Compactness): There exists a compact set
X ⊂ Rn and q, q¯ > 0 such that, for all population sizes N ,
conv
({X i}N
i=1
)
⊆ X and q ≤ qi ≤ q¯ for all i ∈ Z [1, N ]. 
For the game in (11) to approximate the MF game in (7),
we need to ensure that limν→∞ σiν = σ¯ =
1
N
∑N
j=1 x
j , that is
the agents asymptotically reach consensus on the population
average. To this aim we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (Asymptotic average consensus): For all
population sizes N , the weighted adjacency matrix P = PN
satisfies limν→∞ P ν = 1N 1N1
>
N . Equivalently, P is primitive
and doubly stochastic. 
Remark 2: Let us prove the equivalence of the two state-
ments in Assumption 4. If limν→∞ P ν = 1N 1N1
>
N then
there exists h ∈ N such that maxi,j |Phi,j − 1/N | < 1/N .
Consequently, there exists an h > 0 such that Ph is element-
wise strictly positive, which means that the matrix P is prim-
itive. For a primitive and row stochastic matrix, by Perron–
Frobenius theorem [37, Lemma 4], limν→∞ P ν = 1Nw>,
where w> is the left eigenvector of P relative to the dominant
eigenvalue 1 and normalized so that w>1N = 1. It follows
that limν→∞ P ν = 1N 1N1
>
N ⇔ w> = 1N 1N> ⇔ 1N>P =
1N
> ⇔ P is doubly stochastic.
Note that Assumptions 2 and 4 both regard the matrix P ν
but are used to address two different problems and they are
conceptually different. Assumption 2 imposes P νii = 0 for the
fixed value of ν considered in the NA game under analysis.
Assumption 4, on the other hand, is needed when one wants
to use multiple-communication NA games to approximate
the solution to a MF game. Consequently, what matters is
the asymptotic behavior of P νii, which should tend to the
contribution that each agent has in a MF game, i.e. 1/N .
7Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1, the mappings A in (15)
and Aν in (14), for all ν ∈ N, are continuous and have at
least one fixed point. If additionally Assumption 4 holds, then
limν→∞ supz∈RNn ‖Aν(z)−A(z)‖ = 0. 
We next show that, by choosing ν large enough, any fixed
point of Aν is arbitrarily close to a fixed point of A.
Lemma 2 (Fixed point sets): Let the sets of fixed points of
A in (15) and Aν in (14) be F :=
{
z ∈ RNn | z = A(z)}
and Fν :=
{
z ∈ RNn | z = Aν(z)
}
, respectively. If As-
sumptions 1 and 4 hold, then for all  > 0 there exists ν¯ > 0
such that µ(Fν ,F) ≤  for all ν ≥ ν¯. 
We are now ready to state our main theorem regarding the
solution to Problem 2.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold. For
all ε > 0 there exists N¯ such that, for all N > N¯ , there exists
ν¯ > 0 such that, for all ν ≥ ν¯, if z¯ is a fixed point of Aν
in (14), then the set of strategies
{
xi ?
(
z¯i
)}N
i=1
, with xi ? as
in (12) ∀ i ∈ Z[1, N ], is a MF ε-Nash equilibrium for (7). 
We emphasize that, contrary to the case of NA games, where
the fixed point ofAν leads, under Assumption 2, to a NA Nash
equilibrium for finite ν and finite N , in the case of MF games
a MF Nash equilibrium is recovered only asymptotically. This
is due to the fact that, first, the agents are required to almost
reach consensus on the population average (hence ν should be
large enough) and second, the population average depends on
the strategy of agent i with contribution proportional to 1/N
(hence N should be large enough). However, for any desired
ε > 0, the proof of Theorem 2 allows one to derive lower
bounds on N and ν in order to guarantee that
{
xi ?
(
z¯i
)}N
i=1
is
a MF ε-Nash equilibrium. We note that the minimum number
of required communications ν¯ can be computed in a distributed
fashion (Appendix C) and depends on ε but also on the
population size N and on the network P . In case of symmetric
networks this dependence can be further specified in terms of
the spectral properties of P .
Assumption 5 (Spectral properties): For all population
sizes N the weighted adjacency matrix P =PN is symmetric.
There exists µ ∈ [0, 1) such µN := maxλ∈Λ(PN )\{1} |λ| ≤ µ
for all N . 
Corollary 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 5 hold.
If z¯ is a fixed point of Aν in (14), then the set of strategies{
xi ?
(
z¯i
)}N
i=1
, with xi ? as in (12) for all i ∈ Z[1, N ], is a
MF ε-Nash equilibrium for (7), with ε = O( 1N +
√
Nµν). 
In other words, Assumption 5 allows us to derive an upper
bound on ε that is composed by two terms: one that decreases
linearly in 1/N , as for the MF control solution with central
coordinator [17, Remark 3], and one that, for any fixed N ,
decreases exponentially fast on the number of communication
steps ν. According to this bound, the number of communica-
tion steps ν¯ required to achieve a fixed tolerance ε increases
at most logarithmically in the population size N .
Assumption 5 is satisfied, e.g., by the degree-normalized
adjacency matrices of any family of d-regular undirected -
expander graphs [38, Definition 2.2 and Example 2.2]. In fact
µN ≤ 1− 22d2 =: µ [38, Theorem 2.4], [39, Theorem 2].
V. ITERATIVE SCHEMES AND FIXED POINT CONVERGENCE
We now return to update schemes that, under different
conditions, will ensure convergence to a fixed point of Aν .
Algorithm 1: Memoryless update rule (BR)
Initialization. Set k ← 1, choose an initial reference zi(1)
for every agent i.
Iterate until convergence.
Optimization step: each agent i computes its optimal
strategy with respect to the reference zi
xi ? ← arg min
x∈X i
J i(x, zi(k));
Communication step: each agent i updates its neighbors’
state by communicating ν times
σi0 ← xi?;
for s = 0 to s = ν − 1 do
σis+1 ←
∑N
j=1 Pijσ
j
s;
end
and updates the reference
zi(k+1) ← σiν .
k ← k + 1;
The simplest update rule (Algorithm 1) is the one where
each agent selects as strategy its optimal response to the
current neighbors’ aggregate state, that is zi(k) = σ
i
ν (k) :=
P νiix
i ?
(k) +
∑N
j 6=i P
ν
ijx
j ?
(k). Mathematically, we can describe an
iteration of this algorithm as z(k+1) = Aν(z(k)). Under
Assumption 2, the optimal response coincides with the BR,
hence Algorithm 1 coincides with the BR dynamics.
To allow convergence under more general conditions, we
consider extensions of Algorithm 1 where at every step k
each agent i computes its optimal response to a filtered
version of σiν (k), instead of myopically computing the BR.
Specifically, we assume that the agents perform ν1 ∈ [0, ν]
communication steps before updating their strategies and
ν2 = ν − ν1 communications afterwards. Let z(k) be the
vector of local signals at the beginning of step k. After the
first ν1 rounds of communications agent i obtains the averaged
value Aiν1,0(z(k)) :=
∑
j P
ν1
ij z
j
(k) (where the two subscripts
of Aiν1,0 refer to the number of communication steps before
and after the optimization step). Based on this, it computes its
optimal strategy xi ?(k) := x
i ?(Aiν1,0(z(k))), and then commu-
nicates the remaining ν2 times with its neighbors, obtaining
Aiν1,ν2(z(k)) :=
∑
j P
ν2
ij x
j ?(Ajν1,0(z(k))). Finally, it updates
the local signal zi using a feedback mapping Φk that filters
the current aggregate state Aiν1,ν2(z(k)) with the previous local
signal zi(k), that is z
i
(k+1) = Φk
(
zi(k),Aiν1,ν2(z(k))
)
. Since the
agents use information about the previous signal, we refer to
Algorithm 2 as update rule with memory.
Let Φ : RNn × RNn → RNn be the extended feedback
mapping, defined as
Φ(z,Aν1,ν2) :=
[
Φ(z1,A1ν1,ν2); . . . ; Φ(zN ,ANν1,ν2)
]
, (16)
and note that, by construction, it can be computed in a
distributed fashion. An iteration of Algorithm 2 can then be
8Algorithm 2: Update rule with memory
Initialization. Set k ← 1, choose an initial reference zi(1)
for every agent i, a feedback mapping {Φk}∞k=1 and
ν1, ν2 ∈ Z≥0, ν1 + ν2 = ν.
Iterate until convergence.
Communication step 1: each agent i updates its estimate
by communicating ν1 times
Ai0,0 ← zi(k);
for s = 0 to s = ν1 − 1 do
Ais+1,0 ←
∑N
j=1 PijAjs,0;
end
Optimization step: each agent i computes its optimal
strategy with respect to the current estimate Aiν1,0
xi ? ← arg min
x∈X i
J i(x,Aiν1,0);
Communication step 2: each agent i updates its estimate
by communicating ν2 times
Aiν1,0 ← xi?;
for s = 0 to s = ν2 − 1 do
Aiν1,s+1 ←
∑N
j=1 PijAjν1,s;
end
and updates the reference
zi(k+1) ← Φk
(
zi(k),Aiν1,ν2
)
.
k ← k + 1;
described by z(k+1) = Φ(z(k),Aν1,ν2
(
z(k)
)
). As candidate
feedback mappings, we consider different classes of fixed
point iterations from operator theory. The simplest feedback
mapping is the Picard–Banach iteration [40, Theorem 2.1]
z(k+1) = Φ
P–B(z(k),Aν1,ν2
(
z(k)
)
) := Aν1,ν2
(
z(k)
)
. (17)
Using this mapping and setting (ν1, ν2) = (0, ν) it is easy to
see that Algorithm 1 is a particular case of Algorithm 2; from
now on we therefore restrict our attention to the latter algo-
rithm. More general fixed point iterations are the Krasnoselskij
iteration [40, Theorem 3.2]
ΦK(z(k),Aν1,ν2
(
z(k)
)
) := (1− λ)z(k) + λAν1,ν2
(
z(k)
)
(18)
with λ ∈ (0, 1), and the step-dependent Mann iteration [40,
Definition 4.1]
ΦMk (z(k),Aν1,ν2(z(k))) := (1− αk)z(k) + αkAν1,ν2(z(k)),
(19)
where the sequence (αk)
∞
k=1 is such that αk ∈ (0, 1) ∀k ≥ 0,
limk→∞ αk = 0 and
∑∞
k=1 αk =∞ (e.g., αk = 1/k).
The following result provides conditions on the cost func-
tions and on the network structure under which the sequence
of vectors used to compute the optimal responses,([A1ν1,0(z(k)); . . . ; ANν1,0(z(k))])∞k=1 , (20)
converges as k tends to infinity to a fixed point of the
aggregation mappingAν in (14). As a consequence, {xi ?(k)}Ni=1
converges to the desired Nash equilibrium configuration, ac-
cording to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Let
Mi :=
[
qiQ −C
−C> qiQ
]
, i ∈ Z [1, N ] . (21)
Theorem 3: Under Assumption 1, the following iterations
and conditions guarantee that the sequence in (20) converges,
for any initial vector z0 ∈ RNn, to a fixed point ofAν in (14).
eq. (ν1, ν2) cost (∀i) network
1. ΦP–B (17) (0, ν) Mi  0 ‖P‖ ≤ 1
2. ΦK (18) (0, ν) Mi < 0 ‖P‖ ≤ 1
3. ΦP–B (17) (ν/2, ν/2) −qiQ 4 C ≺ 0 P =P>
4. ΦMk (19) (ν/2, ν/2) C  0 P = P>
The mapping Aν has a unique fixed point in case 1. 
The assumption P = P> corresponds to having an undirected
graph with symmetric weights. The assumption ‖P‖ ≤ 1
is more involved. In general, the 2-norm coincides with the
largest singular value of the matrix P . In case of an undi-
rected symmetric graph, the singular values coincide with the
magnitude of the eigenvalues, hence the 2-norm results in the
spectral radius of the matrix P , which under the assumption
of row-stochasticity is 1. Hence the condition ‖P‖ ≤ 1 is
always satisfied for symmetric graphs. In the case of directed
graphs one can use Ho¨lder’s inequality ‖P‖ ≤√‖P‖1‖P‖∞
to prove that any doubly-stochastic matrix P satisfies the
assumption.
It follows from the proof of Theorem 3 that whenever
ΦP–B is applicable so are ΦK and ΦM, and whenever ΦK is
applicable so is ΦM. Which one among the possible choices of
feedback mappings provides the best convergence performance
is in general problem dependent; known convergence rates are
available for ΦP–B [40, Theorem 2.1].
VI. NETWORK APPLICATIONS
A. Multi-dimentional constrained opinion dynamics in social
networks with stubborn agents
The constrained opinion dynamics problem introduced in
Section II-A can be rewritten as a single-communication (ν =
1) NA game, as defined in (4), by using the cost function (6)
with qi := (1 + θi), Q = In, C = −In, c = −θixi(0) and
constraint set X i. Since σi does not depend on xi, Pii = 0
for every i and Assumption 2 is satisfied. Consequently, by
Theorem 1, if z¯ is a fixed point of the mapping A1 in (14),
then the set of strategies xi ?(z¯i) is a NA Nash equilibrium.
The following result shows that if θi > 0 for all i ∈ Z [1, N ]
and ‖P‖ ≤ 1, the BR dynamics converge to the unique fixed
point of A1. If some followers are present in the population,
then a Nash equilibrium configuration can be reached using
the update rule with local memory.
Corollary 2: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The fol-
lowing iterations and conditions guarantee convergence of the
opinions computed according to Algorithm 2, from any initial
configuration, to a NA Nash equilibrium for (1).
eq. (ν1, ν2) cost (∀i) network
1. ΦP–B (17) (0, 1) θi > 0 ‖P‖ ≤ 1;
2. ΦK (18) (0, 1) ‖P‖ ≤ 1. 
Note that Algorithm 2 associated with the feedback mapping
ΦP–B and (ν1, ν2) = (0, 1) corresponds to the BR dynamics
9Fig. 2: Three different network topologies: fully connected,
directed ring and undirected small world. The top line is for
a population of N = 10, the bottom for N = 100 agents.
The small world networks have been generated by adding
undirected shortcut links to the undirected ring topology, each
with probability 0.3 [41]. The weights have been assigned
so that the resulting P matrix is doubly stochastic. The
corresponding matrices verify ‖P‖ = 1.
(Algorithm 1) that are typically studied in the literature of co-
ordination games. The use of the feedback mapping ΦK, on the
other hand, extends the previous setting to the case of agents
with memory. This additional feature allows one to recover
a Nash equilibrium in the more general case of a population
possibly containing both stubborn agents and followers. Note
that the conditions of Corollary 2 are only sufficient, therefore
there might be cases where the BR dynamics converge even
in the presence of followers. It is however possible to find
cases where the BR dynamics do not converge; an example is
a population of followers communicating through a directed
ring network.
To investigate the performance of the two schemes we
consider a case study where each agent i has n = 2 opinions
xi =
[
xi1, x
i
2
]>
, regarding two different topics, taking values
in X i := {[x1, x2]> | ‖x1 − x2‖2 ≤ 0.3} and is either
a follower or partially stubborn with θi = 1. Figure 3
reports the number of iterations required to reach convergence
as a function of the population size N for two different
compositions of the population and three different network
topologies, illustrated in Figure 2. These simulations show that
the convergence speed depends only mildly on the population
size, making our approach scalable.
B. Demand-response methods and mean field control with
local communication
By assuming an affine dependence of the cost on the
population average, that is,
p(σ¯t) := λσ¯t + p0, λ > 0, (22)
the game in (3) can be rewritten as the MF game in (7) with
xi = ui and cost function as in (6) with σi = σ¯, qi = ρi,
Q = IT , C =
λ
2 IT , c =
p0
2 − θxˆi. Note that, since s(u) is
an affine function of the input u, the constraint [s(u);u] ∈
(Si ×U i) ∩ Ci can be rewritten as a unique constraint on the
input, ui = xi ∈ X i, that is convex and compact if U i,Si, Ci
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Fig. 3: Average number of iterations (solid line) and 90%
confidence intervals as a function of the population size N
for the three different network topologies of Figure 2. The
plot on the top refers to a population where only partially
stubborn agents are present and update their opinion using
the BR scheme (ΦP–B), while the plot on the bottom refers
to a population composed by half partially stubborn and half
follower agents, using the scheme with memory (ΦK). In each
case, 50 different networks and populations were simulated
with initial opinions chosen according to a uniform distribution
in [0, 1]2. For each stubborn agent the initial opinion was
projected on X i to guarantee feasibility of the constraints
in (1). The stopping criterion is ‖z(k) − z(k−1)‖∞≤10−5.
are convex and compact. The previous theory can be used to
find a MF ε-Nash equilibrium using local communications.
Corollary 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold,
and let p(σ¯t) be as in (22). The following iterations and
conditions guarantee convergence of the strategies computed
according to Algorithm 2, from any initial point, to a MF
εN,ν-Nash equilibrium for (3).
eq. (ν1, ν2) cost (∀i) network
1. ΦP–B (17) (0, ν) ρi > λ2 ‖P‖ ≤ 1;
2. ΦK (18) (0, ν) ρi ≥ λ2 ‖P‖ ≤ 1;
3. ΦMk (19) (ν/2, ν/2) P = P
>. 
10
The model given in (3) can be used to describe demand-
response methods for heating ventilation air conditioning
(HVAC) systems in smart buildings, as suggested in [33], by
selecting ρi = θγ2i , where θ > 0 is the cost coefficient of
the Taguchi loss function and γi > 0 specifies the thermal
characteristic of the HVAC system. In [33, Theorems 1, 2]
it is shown that, for N > 3, if γi = γ > 0 for all i,
U i = [uimin, uimax] ⊂ Rn with uimin, uimax ∈ Rn, and λ ≤ 2θγ2N−3 ,
then the Nash equilibrium is unique and can be computed
using a control algorithm involving a central coordinator.
Corollary 3 proves that Algorithm 2, on the other hand, can
be used to find an ε-Nash equilibrium in a distributed fashion,
under less stringent conditions. Firstly, it allows arbitrary
convex constraints ui ∈ U i, instead of box constraints, hence
including the case of joint stage constraints, ramping and
more general dynamics. Secondly, convergence is guaranteed
using only local communications over a network that satisfies
‖P‖ ≤ 1 and Assumption 4, instead of requiring the presence
of a central coordinator. Thirdly, it demands the less stringent
assumption λ < 2θγ2i for all i (or no assumption at all if
additionally P = P>), making the problem scalable for large
population sizes. As a drawback, a MF ε-Nash equilibrium
is reached instead of an exact one, with ε arbitrarily small
for large populations. As a particular case we consider a
hierarchical communication structure that models the fact that
groups of buildings are managed by the same company. For
simplicity, let us assume that there are M companies and
each one manages B buildings, for a total of N = MB
buildings. At every communication step the managers compute
the aggregate power demand of their buildings, then commu-
nicate among each other using a network PM ∈ RM×M and
finally compute the price signal for their buildings. With the
convention that buildings controlled by the same manager are
grouped together in the extended vector and that the manager
is the first agent of the corresponding block, the above scheme
corresponds to the overall weighted adjacency matrix
P =
(
IM ⊗
[ 1 0 ... 0
...
...
...
...
1 0 ... 0
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
price dispatch
(PM ⊗ IB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
manager comm.
IM ⊗
 1/B ··· 1/B0 ... 0... ... ...
0 ... 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
local aggregation
= PM ⊗ 1B1B1>B . (23)
Lemma 10 in the Appendix, proves that if PM satisfies the
connectivity conditions of Assumption 4 then also the matrix
P in (23) does and that ‖PM‖2 ≤ 1 implies ‖P‖ ≤ 1.
Moreover, if PM = P>M then P = P
>. It follows from
Corollary 3 that such hierarchical communication structure can
be used, instead of a central coordinator, to steer the population
to an ε-Nash equilibrium.
In Figure 4 we report the number of iterations required to
reach convergence, as a function of the population size N ,
using Algorithm 2 with the mapping ΦM and different number
of communications, and we compare it with the performance
of the traditional centrally coordinated MF control scheme.
As in the opinion dynamics case study, the required number
of iterations is almost independent on the population size.
Moreover, one can notice that already for small values of ν
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Fig. 4: Comparison between the MF control approach with
central unit and the hierarchical distributed approach with
M = 5 and ν = 2, 10, 50. The matrix PM corre-
sponds to a symmetric ring network. The plot on the top
shows the required average number of iterations needed to
reach convergence (and the 90% confidence intervals), the
one on the bottom the average cost improvement εN :=
maxi∈{1,...,N} J¯ i−J i ?, where J¯ i := J
(
x¯i, 1N
∑N
j=1 x¯
j
)
and
J i ? := minxi∈X i J
(
xi, 1N
(
xi +
∑N
j 6=i x¯
j
))
, that an agent
can achieve by unilateral deviations, both as a function of the
population size N . We set λ = 2 and θγ2i = 0.1 for all i. We
consider an horizon of T = 24 hrs and we assume a baseline
energy consumption σ0 as illustrated in [9, Figure 1]. We set
the baseline energy price to p0 := λσ0. The average is com-
puted over 10 different populations with prescheduled energy
consumption xˆi uniformly sampled in [0, 1]T and constraint
set X i := {x ∈ RT≥0 |
∑T
t=1 x
i
t =
∑T
t=1 xˆ
i
t, x
i
t = 0 if t /∈[
T istart, T
i
end
]}, with T istart uniformly sampled in {1, T}, T iend
uniformly sampled in {T istart+1, T}. To guarantee convergence,
we use ΦMk and ν1 = ν2 =
ν
2 . The stopping criterion is‖Aν(Aν1,0(z(k)))−Aν1,0(z(k))‖∞ ≤ 10−3.
the solution to the distributed approach performs similarly to
the solution obtained with the central coordinator. The higher
the number of communications is between two optimization
steps the smaller is ε, as guaranteed by Theorem 2, and the
fewer iterations of Algorithm 2 are required.
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We conclude this section by noting that the model given
in (3) can be also used, by setting ρi sufficiently small, to
compute the optimal charging strategy for large populations
of Plug-in Electrical Vehicles (PEV) [9], [10]. Under the
same conditions of [17, Corollary 3], Corollary 3 (point 3.)
allows to recover a MF ε-Nash equilibrium using a symmetric
network P instead of a central coordinator.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We have considered NA games for populations of agents
with different individual behaviors, constraints and interests,
and affected by the aggregate behavior of their neighbors.
We have characterized the Nash equilibria of such problems
and studied the convergence properties of the BR dynamics.
For cases where it was not possible to guarantee convergence
of the BR dynamics, we have proposed new strategy-update
schemes. Finally, we have shown how the NA setting can be
extended, by allowing multiple rounds of communications, to
provide a distributed solution to the MF control problem.
Our technical results are derived for agents that update their
strategies synchronously and over a fixed network. As future
work, we believe it would be interesting to study whether
similar convergence results can be achieved via asynchronous
updates and time-varying or random communications [42], as
for example using gossip-based communication schemes. For
the multiple communication case, known results from consen-
sus theory could be applied to guarantee that the convergence
requirement σiν (k) → σ¯ is achieved asynchronously.
The concept of social global optimality [43] has not been
considered in this paper. It would be valuable to characterize
the influence of the network structure on the global properties
of the associated NA Nash equilibrium. In other words,
one may favor networks with given properties in other to
coordinate the agents to a desired emergent behavior.
As in traditional aggregative games we have addressed a de-
terministic setting; a valuable extension would be a stochastic
setting where, for instance, the parameters of each agent are
extracted from a probability distribution and/or a random input
enters in the dynamics, as assumed in classical MF games [14,
Section V], [14, Equation 2.1].
Applications of our methods and results include distributed
control and game-theoretic coordination in network systems.
Among others, application domains that can be further ex-
plored are multi-dimensional opinion dynamics on social
networks [44], [45], [46], [47], distributed dynamic demand-
side management of aggregated loads in power grids [8], [33],
congestion control over networks [11], synchronization and
frequency regulation among populations of coupled oscillators
[48], [49],
APPENDIX A
The main idea behind the proof of Theorem 3 is to derive
sufficient conditions on the matrices defining the cost func-
tion (6) and on the network P to guarantee that the extended
aggregation mapping Aν(·) possesses one of the regularity
properties listed in the following definition.
Definition 4 (Regularity properties): Consider the Hilbert
spaceHS defined by the matrix S ∈ Rn×n, S  0. A mapping
f : Rn → Rn is
1) a Contraction (CON) [40, Definition 1.6] in HS if there
exists  ∈ (0, 1] such that
‖f(x)− f(y)‖S ≤ (1− ) ‖x− y‖S , ∀x, y ∈ Rn.
2) Non-Expansive (NE) [50, Definition 4.1 (ii)] in HS if
‖f(x)− f(y)‖S ≤ ‖x− y‖S , ∀x, y ∈ Rn.
3) Firmly Non-Expansive (FNE) [50, Definition 4.1 (i)] in
HS if for all x, y ∈ Rn
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2≤ ‖x− y‖2S−‖f(x)−f(y)−(x−y)‖2S .
4) Strictly Pseudo-Contractive (SPC) [40, Remark 4, pp.
13] in HS if there exists ρ < 1 s.t. for all x, y ∈ Rn
‖f(x)− f(y)‖2S≤‖x− y‖2S+ρ‖f(x)−f(y)−(x−y)‖2S .

Contractiveness is a quite restrictive property, nonetheless
this is the property commonly used in the MF control litera-
ture, see for example [14], [9]. NE mappings are the simplest
generalization of CON mappings. In the technical proofs we
will make use of the following equivalent characterization of
NE affine mappings.
Lemma 3: Consider an affine mapping f : Rn → Rn, x 7→
f(x) := Fx + b, F ∈ Rn×n, b ∈ Rn and R ∈ Rn×n, R  0.
The following statements are equivalent: (1) f is NE in HR.
(2) ‖F‖R ≤ 1. (3) F>RF −R 4 0.
Proof: (1) ⇔ ‖Fr − Fs‖R ≤ ‖r − s‖R ∀r, s ⇔
‖F (r − s)‖R ≤ ‖r − s‖R ∀r, s ⇔ ‖Fx‖R ≤ ‖x‖R ∀x ⇔
(2) ⇔ ‖Fx‖2R ≤ ‖x‖2R ∀x ⇔ x>F>RFx ≤ x>Rx ∀x ⇔
x>(F>RF −R)x ≤ 0 ∀x⇔ (3).
FNE mappings are a particular subclass of NE mappings,
that includes for example the metric projection onto a closed
convex set ProjC : Rn → C ⊆ Rn [50, Proposition 4.8]. In the
technical proofs we will make use of the following equivalent
characterization of FNE mappings.
Lemma 4 ([17, Lemma 5]): A mapping f : Rn →
Rn is FNE in HS if and only if ‖f(x)− f(y)‖2S ≤
(x− y)> S (f(x)− f(y)) , ∀x, y ∈ Rn. 
Finally, SPC mappings are a generalization of NE mappings.
An equivalent characterization of SPC mappings can be given
in terms of monotone mappings.
Definition 5 (Monotonicity): A mapping f : Rn → Rn is
1) Strongly monotone (SMON) [50, Definition 22.1] in
HS if there exists  > 0 such that ∀x, y ∈ Rn,
(f(x)− f(y))> S (x− y) ≥  ‖x− y‖2S .
2) Monotone (MON) [50, Definition 20.1] in HS if
(f(x)− f(y))> S (x− y) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Rn. 
Lemma 5 ([17, Lemma 1 and 2]): 1) If f : Rn → Rn is
MON and g : Rn → Rn is SMON in HS , then f + g is
SMON in HS . 2) If Id − f is Lipschitz and SMON in HS ,
then f is SPC in HS . 
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Theorem 1 (Solution to Problem 1)
Since xi ?(zi) = ProjqiQX i (−(qiQ)−1(Czi + ci)) in (12)
is a continuous mapping in zi the mapping x?(z) in (13)
is continuous in z. Consequently, the mapping Aν(z) =
Pνx?(z) is continuous. By Assumption 1, the set PνX1×N
is compact and convex. Therefore, by the Brouwer fixed
point theorem [51, Theorem 4.1.5] the mapping Aν admits
at least one fixed point. Consider now an arbitrary fixed
point z¯ =
[
z¯1; . . . ; z¯N
] ∈ RNn of the aggregation mapping
Aν in (14), that is z¯i =
∑N
j=1 P
ν
ijx
j ?(z¯j). According to
Definition 3, the set of strategies
{
x¯i := xi ?(z¯i)
}N
i=1
is a
NA Nash equilibrium if any agent i, given the strategies{
x¯j
}N
j 6=i of all the other agents, cannot improve its cost, that is
x¯i = arg miny∈X i J
i
(
y, P νiiy +
∑N
j 6=i P
ν
ij x¯
j
)
. By definition
of fixed point and using the fact that P νii = 0∀i
x¯i = xi ?(z¯i)=arg min
y∈X i
J i(y, z¯i)=arg min
y∈X i
J i(y,
∑N
j=1P
ν
ij x¯
j)
=arg miny∈X i J
i(y, P νiix¯
i+
∑N
j 6=iP
ν
ij x¯
j)
=arg miny∈X i J
i(y, P νiiy +
∑N
j 6=i P
ν
ij x¯
j). 
Proof of Lemma 1 (Properties of the extended aggregation
mappings)
The fact that A(z) = I x?(z) admits at least one fixed
point can be proven as done for Aν(z) = Pνx?(z) in
the proof of Theorem 1. Let DN := maxx∈X1×N ‖x‖;
then for any z ∈ RNn ‖Aν(z) − A(z)‖ = ‖Pνx?(z) −
Ix?(z)‖ ≤ ‖Pν − I‖‖x?(z)‖ ≤ ‖Pν − I‖DN . Hence
supz∈RNn ‖Aν(z) −A(z)‖ ≤ ‖Pν − I‖DN . By Assump-
tion 4, limν→∞ ‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖ = 0 which implies that
limν→∞ ‖Pν − I‖ = limν→∞ ‖(P ν − 1N 1N1>N )⊗ In‖ = 0,
therefore limν→∞ supz∈RNn ‖Aν(z)−A(z)‖ = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2 (Fixed point sets)
The proof of this lemma follows the lines of [52, Lemmas
7.42, 7.44]. In particular, we start from the following lemma.
Lemma 6: Under Assumptions 1 and 4, given two se-
quences (νh ∈ N)∞h=1, (z¯h ∈ RNn)∞h=1 such that
limh→∞ νh =∞, z¯h = Aνh(z¯h),∀h ≥ 1 and limh→∞ z¯h =
z¯, then z¯ = A(z¯).
Proof: For the sake of contradiction, assume z¯ 6= A(z¯).
Then there exists ε > 0 such that B(z¯, ε) ∩ B(A(z¯), ε) = ∅,
where B(z¯, ε) := {x ∈ RNn | ‖x− z¯‖ ≤ ε}. We know that
the following statements hold: 1) Since, by Lemma 1, Aν(·)
converges uniformly to A(·), ∃H1 > 0 : Aνh(u) ∈
B(A(u), ε/2) ∀h ≥ H1,∀u ∈ RNn; 2) Since A(·) is
continuous and z¯h → z¯, ∃H2 > H1 : A(z¯h) ∈
B(A(z¯), ε/2) ∀h ≥ H2; 3) Since z¯h → z¯, ∃H3 >
H2 : z¯h ∈ B(z¯, ε) ∀h ≥ H3. Therefore, from point
1) with u = z¯h and 2) we get that, for all h ≥ H3,
z¯h = Aνh(z¯h) ∈ B(A(z¯h), ε/2) ⊆ B(A(z¯), ε). Hence,
using 3), we get z¯h ∈ (B(A(z¯), ε) ∩ B(z¯, ε)) 6= ∅, for all
h ≥ H3, which is a contradiction.
We now prove Lemma 2. For the sake of contradiction,
suppose that the claim is not true. Then there exists  > 0
and a sequence (νh)
∞
h=1, with νh → ∞, such that ∀h ≥ 1
µ(Fh,F) > . Equivalently, ∀h ≥ 1 ∃z¯h ∈ Fνh such that
µ(z¯h,F) > . Note that z¯h = Aνh(z¯h) ∈ PνhX1×N ⊂(
conv{X i}Ni=1
)N
=: XN for all h ∈ N, and XN is compact
by Assumption 1. Since any sequence defined in a compact
set has a convergent subsequence, we can assume without
loss of generality, that limh→∞ z¯h = z¯ ∈ XN . Note that
µ(z¯h,F) >  for all h ≥ 1 implies that µ(z¯,F) ≥  and
hence z¯ 6∈ F . On the other hand, the sequences (νh)∞h=1
and (z¯h)
∞
h=1 satisfy the conditions in Lemma 6, therefore
z¯ = A(z¯)⇒ z¯ ∈ F , which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 2 (Solution to Problem 2)
We follow a similar argument as in [17, Proof of The-
orem 1]. Given the fact that qi ≥ q for all i, the map-
pings xi ?(zi) = ProjqiQX i (−(qiQ)−1(Czi + ci)) are uniformly
Lipschitz with some constant Lx > 0 , that is ‖xi ?(za) −
xi ?(zb)‖ ≤ Lx‖za−zb‖ for all i and all za, zb ∈ X . Moreover,
given the fact that qi ≤ q¯ for all i, the quadratic cost functions
J i are uniformly Lipschitz in the compact set X×X with some
constant LJ > 0, that is |J i(xa, za)−J i(xb, zb)| ≤ LJ(‖xa−
xb‖ + ‖za − zb‖) for all i and for all xa, xb, za, zb ∈ X . Let
D = maxx∈X ‖x‖. For any (N, ν) ∈ N2, consider an arbitrary
fixed point z¯ =
[
z¯1; . . . ; z¯N
] ∈ RNn of the aggregation
mapping Aν in (14), that is z¯i =
∑N
j=1 P
ν
ijx
j ?(z¯j) and
define the set of strategies x¯i := xi ?(z¯i). Let x˜i ? denote
the optimal strategy, according to problem (7), for agent i
given that the strategies of the others are fixed to
{
x¯j
}N
j 6=i,
that is, x˜i ? := arg miny∈X i J
i
(
y, 1N y +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j
)
and let
˜˜xi ? := arg miny∈X i J
i
(
y, 1N x˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j
)
. Let us also
define the associated costs J¯ i ? = J i
(
x¯i, 1N x¯
i +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j
)
,
J˜ i ? = J i
(
x˜i ?, 1N x˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j
)
= miny∈X i J i(y, 1N y +∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j), and ˜˜J i ? = J i
(
˜˜xi ?, 1N x˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j
)
=
miny∈X i J i
(
y, 1N x˜
i ? +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j
)
. Note that ˜˜J i ? ≤
J˜ i ? ≤ J¯ i ?. We define z˜i := 1N x˜i ? +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j , so that
˜˜xi = xi ?(z˜i), and note that
|J¯ i ? − J˜ i ?| ≤ |J¯ i ? − ˜˜J i ?|
= |J i(x¯i, 1N x¯i +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j)− J i(˜˜xi, 1N x˜i ? +
∑N
j 6=i
1
N x¯
j)|
≤ LJ(‖x¯i − ˜˜xi‖+ 1N ‖x¯i − x˜i ?‖)
= LJ(‖xi ?(z¯i)− xi ?(z˜i)‖+ 1
N
‖x¯i − x˜i ?‖)
≤ LJ(Lx‖z¯i − z˜i‖+ 1N ‖x¯i − x˜i ?‖) ≤ LJ(Lx‖z¯i − z˜i‖+ 2DN )
and ‖z¯i − z˜i‖ = ‖P νiix¯i − 1N x˜i ? +
∑N
j 6=i(P
ν
ij − 1N )x¯j‖
≤ ‖P νiix¯i − 1N x˜i ?‖+ ‖
∑N
j 6=i(P
ν
ij − 1N )x¯j‖
≤ ‖P νiix¯i − 1N x¯i + 1N x¯i − 1N x˜i ?‖+
∑N
j 6=i ‖(P νij − 1N )x¯j‖
≤∑Nj=1 ‖(P νij − 1N )x¯j‖+ 1N ‖x¯i − x˜i ?‖
≤ D(∑Nj=1 |P νij − 1N |+ 2N ) ≤ D(‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ + 2N ).
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Hence |J¯ i ?− J˜ i ?| ≤ 2LJ(Lx+ 1)D(‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞+
1
N ) := K(‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ + 1N ). Consequently, an ar-
bitrary agent i can improve its cost at most by an amount
εN,ν := K(‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ + 1N ) if all other strategies{
x¯j := xj ?(z¯j)
}N
j 6=i are fixed. Therefore, the set of strategies{
x¯i
}N
i=1
is an εN,ν-Nash equilibrium for the MF game in (7).
K is a constant that does not depend on N,P or ν and for
any fixed N we have ‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ → 0 as ν → ∞.
Consequently, for all ε > 0 and for any fixed N > N¯ := Kε ,
there exists ν¯ such that for all ν ≥ ν¯, we have εN,ν < ε . 
Proof of Corollary 1
By the proof of Theorem 2 the set of strategies{
xi ?(z¯i)
}N
i=1
is an εN,ν-Nash equilibrium for the MF game
in (7), with εN,ν = K( 1N + ‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞). By
the properties of the matrix norm ‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ ≤√
N‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖2 =
√
Nσmax(P
ν − 1N 1N1>N ) =√
N maxλ∈Λ(P ν− 1N 1N1>N ) |λ| =
√
NµνN ≤
√
Nµν , where we
used the fact that the matrix P ν − 1N 1N1>N is symmetric
and, since P is symmetric, primitive and doubly stochastic,
1 is a simple eigenvalue and it holds Λ(P ν − 1N 1N1>N ) =
((Λ(P ))ν\{1}) ∪ {0}. Hence εN,ν ≤ K( 1N +
√
Nµν).
Proof of Theorem 3 (Convergence of Algorithm 1 and 2)
To study the convergence of Algorithm 1 and 2, we start by
studying the regularity properties of the mappingAν . First, we
analyze the regularity properties of the constrained minimizer
xi ? of problem (12).
Lemma 7 (Regularity of the constrained minimizer): For
any i ∈ Z[1, N ], let xi ?(zi) be as in (12) and Mi as in (21).
The following facts hold: 1) If Mi  0, then the mapping
xi ? is a CON in HQ; 2) If Mi < 0, then the mapping xi ? is
NE in HQ; 3) If −qiQ 4 C ≺ 0, then the mapping xi ? is
FNE in H−C ; 4) If 0 ≺ C, then the mapping −xi ? is MON
in HC . 
Proof: The proof is an extension to the proof of [17, The-
orem 2] for the case of heterogeneous cost functions and fol-
lows from the proof of [21, Theorem 2]. It is reported here for
completeness. Note that xi ?(zi) := ProjqiQX i (−(qiQ)−1(Czi+
ci)). 1) and 2) follow from [17, Theorem 2] by setting
Q = qiQ,∆ = 0 and by noting that xi ? is CON/NE in HQ if
and only if the same holds in HqiQ. 3) From [50, Proposition
4.8] we have that ProjQX i is FNE in HQ, hence by Lemma 4
in Appendix A we have that, for all v, w ∈ Rn,
(ProjQX i(−(qiQ)−1(Cv+ci))− ProjQX i(−(qiQ)−1(Cw+ci)))>
·Q (−(qiQ)−1C(v − w)) ≥∥∥∥ProjQX i(−(qiQ)−1(Cv+ci))−ProjQX i(−(qiQ)−1(Cw+ci))∥∥∥2
Q
⇔(xi ?(v)−xi ?(w))>(−q−1i C)(v − w)≥∥∥xi ?(v)−xi ?(w)∥∥2Q
⇔(xi ?(v)−xi ?(w))>(−C)(v − w)≥∥∥xi ?(v)− xi ?(w)∥∥2
qiQ
(24)
Therefore, if qiQ < −C  0 then from (24) we get that(
xi ?(v)− xi ?(w))>(−C)(v − w) ≥ ∥∥xi ?(v)− xi ?(w)∥∥2−C
which implies by Lemma 4 that xi ? is FNE in
H−C . 4) From the last inequality in (24), we get that(−xi ?(v) + xi ?(w))> C(v − w) ≥ 0 for all v, w ∈ Rn. If
C  0, this implies that −xi ?(·) is MON in HC .
Next, we show that the regularity properties of the con-
strained minimizer xi ? in (12) are inherited by the extended
mapping x? in (13).
Lemma 8 (Regularity of the extended optimizer):
Let x?(·) be the extended mapping defined in (13).
Given Mi as in (21), the following facts hold. 1)
If Mi  0 ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ], then the mapping x? is a CON in
HIN⊗Q; 2) If Mi < 0 ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ], then the mapping x?
is NE in HIN⊗Q; 3) If −qiQ 4 C ≺ 0 ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ], then
the mapping x? is FNE in HIN⊗(−C); 4) If 0 ≺ C, then the
mapping −x?(·) is MON in HIN⊗C . 
Proof:
1) For all i ∈ Z[1, N ], if Mi  0 then, by
Lemma 7, the mapping xi ? is a CON in HQ,
with some rate δi ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, for any
r, s ∈ RNn we have ‖x?(r) − x?(s)‖2IN⊗Q =
‖ [x1 ?(r1)−x1 ?(s1); . . . ;xN ?(rN )−xN ?(sN )] ‖2IN⊗Q
= ‖x1 ?(r1) − x1 ?(s1)‖2Q + . . . + ‖xN ?(rN ) −
xN ?(sN )‖2Q ≤ (1 − δ1)2‖r1 − s1‖2Q + . . . + (1 −
δN )
2‖rN −sN‖2Q ≤ (1−mini∈Z[1,N ] δi)2‖r−s‖2IN⊗Q.
Note that δ := mini∈Z[1,N ] δi is strictly positive since
N is finite.
2) If Mi < 0 then, by Lemma 7, the mapping xi ? is NE
in HQ. The proof is the same as in the previous point,
with δi = 0 for all i.
3) If −qiQ 4 C ≺ 0 ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ] then, by Lemma 7,
the mappings xi ? are FNE in H(−C). Therefore, by
Lemma 4, for all r, s ∈ RNn we have ‖x?(r) −
x?(s)‖2IN⊗(−C) =
∑N
i=1 ‖xi ?(ri)− xi ?(si)‖2(−C)
≤∑Ni=1(ri − si)>(−C)(xi ?(ri)− xi ?(si))
= (r − s)>(IN ⊗ (−C))(x?(r)− x?(s)).
4) If 0 ≺ C then, by Lemma 7, the mappings −xi ?
are MON in HC . Therefore, for any r, s ∈ RNn
we have (−x?(r) + x?(s))> (IN ⊗ C) (r − s) =∑N
i=1
(−xi ?(ri) + xi ?(si))> C (ri − si) ≥ 0.
The following lemma proves that the linear mapping x 7→
Pνx is NE, if ‖P‖ ≤ 1.
Lemma 9: Consider P ∈ RN×N , ν ∈ N andPν = P ν⊗In.
For any S ∈ Rn×n , S  0, let S := IN ⊗ S. If ‖P‖ ≤ 1,
then ‖Pν‖S ≤ 1. 
Proof: The condition ‖P‖ ≤ 1 implies ‖P ν‖ ≤ ‖P‖ν ≤
1. By Lemma 3 (R = IN ) this implies
(
P ν>P ν − IN
)
4 0.
Moreover, by Lemma 3 (R = S), ‖Pν‖S ≤ 1 ⇔
Pν>SPν − S 4 0 ⇔ (P ν ⊗ In)> (IN ⊗ S) (P ν ⊗ In) −
IN⊗S 4 0⇔
(
P ν> ⊗ I>n
)
(IN ⊗ S) (P ν ⊗ In)−IN⊗S 4
0⇔
(
P ν>INP ν ⊗ I>n SIn
)
− IN ⊗S 4 0⇔
(
P ν>P ν
)
⊗
S − IN ⊗ S 4 0⇔
(
P ν>P ν − IN
)
⊗ S 4 0. Since S  0
and
(
P ν>P ν − IN
)
4 0, by the properties of the Kronecker
product we conclude that
(
P ν>P ν − IN
)
⊗ S 4 0. Finally,
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by the previous equivalence, we have ‖Pν‖S ≤ 1.
Note that a single iteration of Algorithm 2 updates the signal
z(k) =
[
z1(k); . . . ; z
N
(k)
]
according to the mapping
Aν1,ν2(z) := Pν2x?(Pν1z) (25)
and A0,ν ≡ Aν . The following proposition characterizes the
regularity properties of Aν1,ν2 for different choices of ν1, ν2.
Proposition 1 (Regularity of the update mapping): The
following statements hold.
1) If Mi  0 ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ] and ‖P‖ ≤ 1, then the mapping
A0,ν ≡ Aν in (14) is a CON in HIN⊗Q;
2) If Mi < 0 ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ] and ‖P‖ ≤ 1, then the mapping
A0,ν ≡ Aν in (14) is NE in HIN⊗Q;
3) If −qiQ 4 C ≺ 0 ∀i ∈ Z[1, N ], ν ∈ 2N and P = P>,
then the mapping A ν
2 ,
ν
2
in (25) is FNE in HIN⊗(−C);
4) If 0 ≺ C, ν ∈ 2N and P = P>, then the mapping
A ν
2 ,
ν
2
in (25) is SPC in HIN⊗C . 
Proof:
1) Let S := IN ⊗ Q. By Lemma 8, x? is a CON in HS
and, by Lemmas 3 and 9, Pν is NE in HS. Hence the
mapping Aν = Pνx?, composition of a CON mapping
and a NE one, is a CON in HS.
2) Analogous to the proof of statement 1, with x? NE.
3) Let S := IN⊗(−C). From Lemma 8, x? is FNE in HS.
Since P is by construction a row-stochastic matrix and
P = P>, P is a doubly stochastic matrix. Consequently
‖P‖1 = ‖P‖∞ = 1. From Ho¨lder’s inequality, we have
‖P‖ ≤√‖P‖1 · ‖P‖∞ = 1. Therefore, from Lemma 9,
‖P ν
2
‖S ≤ 1. Moreover, P = P> implies P ν2 = P ν2 >
and P ν
2
S = (P ν2 ⊗ In)(IN ⊗S) = (P ν2 ⊗S) = SP ν2 .
Therefore for any r, s ∈ RNn,
‖A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(r)−A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(s)‖2S (26)
= ‖P ν
2
(x?(P ν
2
(r)))−P ν
2
(x?(P ν
2
(s)))‖2S
≤ ‖P ν
2
‖2S ‖x?(P ν2 (r))− x?(P ν2 (s))‖2S
≤ ‖x?(P ν
2
(r))− x?(P ν
2
(s))‖2S
≤ (P ν
2
r −P ν
2
s
)> S (x?(P ν
2
(r))− x?(P ν
2
(s))
)
= (r − s)>P ν
2
>S (x?(P ν
2
(r))− x?(P ν
2
(s))
)
= (r − s)> SP ν
2
(
x?(P ν
2
(r))− x?(P ν
2
(s))
)
= (r − s)> S (A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(r)−A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(s)
)
,
where the third inequality derives from x? being FNE.
The inequality in (26) implies that A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(·) is FNE in
HS , by Lemma 4.
4) Let S := IN ⊗C. From Lemma 8, −x?(·) is MON in
HS . Moreover P = P> implies that P ν2 >S = SP ν2 .
Therefore for any r, s ∈ RNn,(−A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(r) +A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(s)
)> S (r − s)
=
(−P ν
2
(x?(P ν
2
(r))) +P ν
2
(x?(P ν
2
(s)))
)>S (r − s)
=
(−x?(P ν
2
(r)) + x?(P ν
2
(s))
)>P ν
2
>S (r − s)
=
(−x?(P ν
2
(r)) + x?(P ν
2
(s))
)> S (P ν
2
r −P ν
2
s
)
= (−x?(r˜) + x?(s˜))> S (r˜ − s˜) ≥ 0,
which implies that −A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(·) is MON in HS . Since
INn(·) is SMON, it follows from Lemma 5 that INn(·)−
A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(·) is SMON and Lipschitz, since it is the compo-
sition of Lipschitz mappings. Consequently, A ν
2 ,
ν
2
(·) is
SPC in HS, by Lemma 5.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3. We start by noting
that, since the sets X i are convex and compact for every i ∈
Z [1, N ], the mapping Aν1,ν2 : Pν2X1×N → Pν2X1×N is
defined from a compact and convex set to itself. For simplicity
let a(k) (ν1, ν2, z0) :=
[A1ν1,0(z(k)); . . . ; ANν1,0(z(k))].
Proof of statement 1 and 2 of Theorem 3 : From Proposi-
tion 1, under the assumption of statement 1 (or statement 2),
A0,ν(·) ≡ Aν(·) is CON (or NE) in HIN⊗Q. Therefore,
by using ΦP–B (or ΦK) z(k) converges to a fixed point of
the mapping Aν [40, Theorem 2.1] ([40, Theorem 3.2]).
The proof is immediate upon noticing that, since ν1 = 0,
a(k) := Pν1z(k) ≡ z(k). Moreover, a CON mapping has a
unique fixed point [40, Theorem 2.1].
Proof of statement 3 and 4 of Theorem 3 : From Proposi-
tion 1, under the assumption of statement 3 (or statement 4)
the mapping z(k) 7→ A ν2 , ν2 (z(k)) is FNE (or SPC). Therefore,
by using ΦP–B (or ΦMk ) z(k) converges to a fixed point z¯ of
the mapping A ν
2 ,
ν
2
, [53, Section 1, p. 522] ([40, Fact 4.9, p.
112]) . Note that a(k) := Pν1z(k) hence, for ν1 = ν2 , a(k)
converges to a¯ := P ν
2
z¯, which is a fixed point of the mapping
Aν since z¯ = A ν2 , ν2 (z¯) ⇒ z¯ = P ν2x?(P ν2 (z¯)) ⇒ P ν2 z¯ =Pνx?(P ν2 (z¯))⇒ a¯ = Pνx?(a¯)⇒ a¯ = Aν(a¯). 
Proof of Corollary 2 (Convergence to a NA Nash equilibrium
in the opinion dynamics application)
For every agent i ∈ Z [1, N ], the following equivalence
holds Mi =
[
qiQ −C
−C qiQ
]
=
[
(1 + θi) 1
1 (1 + θi)
]
⊗ In,
hence the eigenvalues of Mi are θi and 1 + θi, both with
multiplicity n. It follows that if θi > 0 then Mi  0, if
θi ≥ 0 then Mi < 0. Consequently, by Theorem 3 the given
conditions guarantee convergence of Algorithm 2 to a fixed
point z¯ of the aggregation mapping A1. Since Assumption 2
is satisfied, Theorem 1 guarantees that the set of strategies{
xi ?(z¯i)
}N
i=1
is a NA Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Corollary 3 (Convergence to an ε-Nash equilibrium
in demand-response methods)
Given the cost function in (3) with p(σ¯t) := λσ¯t + p0,
the following equivalence holds Mi =
[
qiQ −C
−C qiQ
]
=[
ρi −λ2
−λ2 ρi
]
⊗ IT , hence the eigenvalues of Mi are ρi + λ2
and ρi − λ2 , both with multiplicity T . It follows that if
ρi − λ2 > 0, then Mi  0 while if ρi − λ2 ≥ 0 then Mi < 0.
Moreover, C = λ2 IT  0. Consequently, by Theorem 3 the
given conditions guarantee convergence of Algorithm 2 to a
fixed point z¯ of the aggregation mapping Aν . The conclusion
follows from Theorem 2. 
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Lemma 10: If PM ∈ RM×M satisfies Assumption 4, then
also P = PM ⊗ 1B1B1>B does. Moreover, if ‖PM‖ ≤ 1, then‖P‖ ≤ 1.
Proof: By the properties of the Kronecher
product we have limν→∞
(
PM ⊗ 1B1B1>B
)ν
=
limν→∞
(
P νM ⊗ 1B1B1>B
)
=
(
1
M 1M1
>
M
) ⊗ ( 1B1B1>B) =
1
MB1MB1
>
MB =
1
N 1N1
>
N . Moreover, ‖P‖ =√
ρ(P>P ) =
√
ρ
((
P>M ⊗ 1B1B1>B
) (
PM ⊗ 1B1B1>B
))
=√
ρ
(
P>MPM ⊗ 1B1B1>B
)
=
√
ρ
(
P>MPM
)
= ‖PM‖ ≤ 1,
where we used the fact that the matrix 1B1B1
>
B has all
the eigenvalues in 0 except one which is equal to 1, all
the eigenvalues of P>MPM are nonnegative real and the
eigenvalues of the Kronecker product are the product of the
eigenvalues of the two matrices.
APPENDIX C
From the proof of Theorem 2 for any ε > 0 and N >
N¯ := Kε , the set of strategies {xi ?(z¯i)}Ni=1 is MF ε-Nash
equilibrium if ‖P ν − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ ≤ εd := εK − 1N . If the
Algorithm 3: Precomputing ν¯ on a given network P
Initialization: k ← 0, fix εd > 0, si ← 0 ∀i, P 0 = In.
Iterate until si = 1 : Each agent i synchronously
1) receives the weight coefficients {P khj}Nj=1 from each
of its neighbors h ∈ N i
2) computes {P k+1ij =
∑
h∈N i PihP
k
hj}Nj=1
3) if
∑N
j=1 |P k+1ij − 1N | < εd, then si ← 1, else si ← 0
4) repeats N times si ← minj∈N i∪{i}{sj}
k ← k + 1
Output: ν¯ ← k.
network is strongly connected and Assumption 4 holds, then
it is possible to compute, for any εd > 0 and in a distributed
fashion, a value of ν¯ such that ‖P ν¯ − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ ≤ εd by
using Algorithm 3. The proof is based on the following fact:
suppose that each agent i has a value of si ∈ {0, 1}. Since the
graph is strongly connected after at most N iterations of the
update si ← minj∈N i∪{i}{sj} the agents reach consensus to
a value s which is 1 if all the si at the beginning were equal
to 1 and is 0 otherwise. Therefore if Algorithm 3 terminates
it must be at a value ν¯ for which
∑N
j=1 |P ν¯ij− 1N | < εd for all
i, which in turn implies ‖P ν¯ − 1N 1N1>N‖∞ ≤ εd. Note that
Assumption 4 guarantees that for each agent i, there exists
a value ν¯i such that
∑N
j=1 |P kij − 1N | < εd for all k ≥ ν¯i.
Hence for k > max{ν¯i}Ni=1, si = 1 for all i and Algorithm 3
is guaranteed to terminate in a finite number of iterations.
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